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ABSTRACT
This article examines the growing influences of the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR), and controversies arising as a result of the 
Court’s movement toward establishing itself as a de facto Supreme 
Court of member nations of the Council of Europe (CoE) in the area 
of human and civil rights, including religious freedom. Responses to 
criticisms of the Court are considered, as is the growing problem of 
some member states refusing to enforce rulings of the Court. Some 
recent cases, mostly involving Islam, that seem to demonstrate a 
growing recognition of the ethnic, cultural, and legal pluralism that 
exists within the expanded CoE are examined. Also discussed is the 
apparent two-track approach the Court has taken as a result of having 
to manage religious freedom within such a diverse group of member 
nations.
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Introduction
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR or the Court) is the court of last resort 
concerning possible violations of human and civil rights for citizens in the 47 member 
states of the Council of Europe (CoE). It is a major part of the enforcement machinery 
established after WWII to promote western democratic values as presented in the 
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (herein the 
European Convention) which was developed by the nascent Council of Europe 
in 1950 and went into force in 1953, having been signed by all original members of 
the CoE (Harris et al., 2009). Established initially as a part-time court nearly seven 
decades ago, the Court was an important part of efforts to preclude atrocities such 
as occurred during WWII. Establishment of the Court also was meant to deter the 
spread of communism by emphasizing other values, goals, and methods of societal 
organization (Madsen, 2016). The Court, which became a full-time court in 1998, has 
since evolved considerably and grown in influence within the European region and 
around the world (Fokas, 2015/2016; Fokas & Richardson, 2018; Richardson, 2015; 
Koenig, 2015; Hammer & Emmert, 2012). The Court has sometimes worked with 
constitutional and other courts in CoE nations in efforts to promote human and civil 
rights in CoE nations. This has been especially the case with newer member states 
of the CoE which were accepted as members by the CoE after collapse of the Soviet 
Union (Sadurski, 2008/2009; Richardson & Shterin, 2008). The growing influence and 
power of the Court has suggested to some observers that it is rapidly becoming a de 
facto Supreme Court of Europe in the human and civil rights arena (Harris et al., 2009, 
p. 2; Koenig, 2015, p. 51; Madsen, 2016, p. 141).
Herein I will summarize some important recent changes in how the Court 
operates, and also discuss major problems being faced by the Court in recent years. 
I will also review selected recent decisions of import for religious freedom in the CoE 
member states. Included in cases discussed are several that involve variants of 
Islam, and which, taken together, seem to suggest that the Court is becoming more 
accommodating of the cultural, religious, ethnic, and legal pluralism that exists within 
the CoE2. Also covered will be the large number of pending ECtHR cases deriving from 
Russia’s effort to apply extremism laws to religious groups, including the Jehovah’s 
Witnesses, Islam, and other minority faiths. I will conclude with a brief analysis of how 
the Court has responded to its many pressures, and of how it seems to be developing 
a unique pattern of jurisprudence cognizant of the vast differences that exist within the 
enlarged CoE. 
2 In brief, legal pluralism refers to “…the presence of different legal traditions and institutions within 
a single political framework such as a state, thereby raising problems about how laws might be enforced 
and recognizing the prospect of contradictory traditions” (Turner, Possamai & Richardson, 2014, p. 1). 
For discussions of legal pluralism see Merry (1988), Tamanaha (2009), Berman (2007), and Richardson 
(2014b). For applications of the concept to Shari’a law in western societies see Possamai, Richardson 
and Turner (2014), Aires and Richardson (2014), and Richardson (2014a/2014c). For development of 
specific theoretically grounded hypotheses in this area of socio-legal studies see Richardson and 
Springer (2013).
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Recent Changes in How the Court Functions
Recently, I summarized the history and organization of the CoE and the Court (Richardson, 
2017), describing a number of recent significant changes in how the Court operates and 
in the Court’s jurisprudential pattern concerning religion that has developed of late. These 
changes, a few major ones which will be highlighted herein, were brought about in part 
because of concern among some both older and newer member states about the growing 
influence and power of the Court, as well as concern over the huge growth in applications 
that has occurred in large part because nations formerly dominated by the Soviet Union 
have affiliated with the CoE. The history and culture of former Soviet nations has had the 
effect of forcing the Court to take into account significant differences among those nations.
The recent changes have developed against a background of decades during which 
the Court operated by giving great deference to the “margin of appreciation” doctrine, 
established early in the Court’s history with the Handyside v. United Kingdom (7 Dec 
1976) decision when the CoE was much smaller and culturally more homogeneous 
(Adrian, 2018; Beaman, 2016; Jusic, 2018; McGoldrick, 2016). This doctrine allows 
original member states to monitor their internal affairs in areas of national sensitivity 
without external interference from the then newly-formed ECtHR. As Fokas (2016, p. 552) 
has noted, “religion holds a special place in the ‘politics of the margin of appreciation’”, 
a point also made by Ringelheim (2012), with the Court often allowing an expanded 
margin of appreciation in such cases. However, the overall doctrine has evolved in 
recent decades with the Court issuing rulings viewed by governments of some member 
states as unduly intrusive and ill-advised. This has been especially the case with the 
United Kingdom and Russia, but also other member states, including both original and 
newer member states (Koenig, 2015; Fokas, 2016; Madsen, 2016; Richardson, 2017)3. 
One major way some members of the CoE have attempted to gain leverage over 
the ECtHR is by gaining support for the principle of “subsidiarity” by which is meant 
that decisions should be made at the lowest possible political level. To emphasize 
this concept a new section was added the end of the preamble to the Convention 
mentioning both the subsidiarity principle and the margin of appreciation. That section, 
added as a result of the Brighton Statement4, reads as follows: 
Affirming that the High Contracting Parties, in accordance with the principle of 
subsidiarity, have the primary responsibility to secure the rights and freedoms 
defined in this Convention and the Protocols thereto, and that in doing so they 
enjoy a margin of appreciation, subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the 
European Court of Human Rights established by this Convention.
Thus, it is clear that the Court must work with governments to promote the values 
expounded in the Convention.
3 Koenig (2015, p. 61) also makes the point that the growth of concerns about human rights throughout 
the CoE has also been a major contributor to the huge case growth that the Court has experienced.
4 See: High Level Conference on the Future of the European Court of Human Rights [Brighton 
Declration]. Retrieved from https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/2012_Brighton_FinalDeclaration_ENG.pdf
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The “pilot judgment” process is another important change in how the Court operates, 
and has contributed to the trend toward the Court becoming a de facto “supreme court 
of Europe”, establishing precedents that should be followed by member states (Sadurski, 
2009; Richardson, 2017). This new procedure is an effort to address the issue of multiple 
and continuing applications to the Court with similar claims that laws from member states, 
especially newer members, violate Convention articles. Pilot judgments have become a 
powerful tool for the Court to deal with what are referred to as structural problems with 
laws of member states. When the Court issues a pilot judgment against a member state 
in a problematic area of law, the member state is expected to modify its legal structure 
to comport with Convention values (as are other member states with similar provisions).
The establishment of a Network of Superior Courts and an agreement allow major 
courts in member states to request advisory opinions from the ECtHR are other recent 
innovations designed to encourage dialogue between the ECtHR and court systems 
in member states (Richardson, 2017). These important changes demonstrated the 
Court’s new willingness to work with national courts to promote ECHR values by 
educating member state’s court personnel about the work and rulings of the ECtHR. 
The changes, most of which were designed to lessen the Court’s dramatically 
increasing case load as well as limit the Court’s reach, also demonstrate that the Court 
is attempting to involve national court systems in the promotion of Convention values. 
The Court’s welcoming of intervention by member states and NGOs in cases 
accepted for adjudication also is a major development with implications for how cases 
are handled as well as outcomes of the adjudication process (Fokas, 2018; Van den 
Eynde, 2013/2017). More “friendly settlements” are also encouraged, which means 
that an agreement between the member state and the applicant has been reached 
short of full adjudication (Richardson, 2017). Such an outcome has occurred with 
increasing frequency when it becomes obvious (perhaps because of other “pilot 
judgments” rendered by the Court) that any forthcoming decision probably will be 
against the government involved.
Remaining Problems and Issues Faced by the Court
When nations affiliate with the CoE they pledge to abide by the Convention. Thus, 
when a decision is rendered against a member state the government in question 
is expected to modify its laws to comport with Convention values and rulings of the 
Court. There is a growing problem of member states refusing to implement decisions 
of the Court (Madsen, 2016; Richardson, 2017). This includes some major decisions 
concerning religious freedom, but also other areas of law as well. A growing number of 
member states are refusing to enforce decisions of the Court or to modify their statutes 
and procedures. Some member states simply pay whatever monetary damages are 
awarded, but do little else to respond to the Court’s decisions. Included among this list 
of recalcitrant member states are Russia, Hungary, Ukraine, Poland, and Turkey, but 
also the U.K., France, and Italy are balking at fully implementing decisions of the Court. 
The worst offenders include Ukraine, which as of 2014 had 1,002 cases filed 
with the Court and with violations found in all but 10 (Madsen, 2016, p. 172). In 2018 
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Ukraine has had 12,000 cases referred to the Council of Ministers for final disposition 
because Ukraine has refused to modify its laws and procedures to address similar 
problems raised by many applicants. Poland’s record is similar with 1,070 cases filed 
since 2014 and violations found in all but 107 of them (Madsen, 2016, p. 172). Italy’s 
failure to address prison reform has been a continuing issue with the Court (Madsen, 
2016, pp. 162–163). And officials the U.K. have expressed considerable concern about 
ECtHR rulings that would grant voting rights to prisoners, among other issues (Bates, 
2014/2015). Turkey and Hungary are other recalcitrant member nations (Madsen, 
2016). Some 27,000 applications deriving from the failed coup d’etat in Hungary were 
declared inadmissible because of failure to exhaust internal remedies (which in fact 
do not exist as an effective way to address the issues raised). Hungary has had over 
6,000 cases dealing with prison overcrowding declared inadmissible because of 
failures to deal with the issues raised internally.
Russia has an especially dismal record overall before the Court. Madsen (2016, 
p. 171) notes that as of 2014 Russia had been the subject of 1,604 cases with the Court, 
with violations found in all but 74 of them, which means that 15% of all judgments 
finding a violation by the Court were against Russia. Russia has lost a number of 
cases dealing with religion before the Court (Lykes & Richardson, 2014; Richardson 
& Lee, 2014) and has more recently begun enforcing extremism laws against minority 
faiths such as the Jehovah’s Witnesses, Islamic groups, and others. As of early 
2019 there are 49 cases involving the Witnesses filed with the Court because of the 
drastic actions taken against the group by Russian authorities. Included in these 
cases are ones concerning the dissolution of the entire national Witness organization, 
the banning of its website, invasions of churches and homes of members, and the 
incarceration and even physical harm being visited upon some members and church 
buildings by Russian police or citizens acting with apparent impunity. The majority 
of these cases have been “communicated” to the Russia authorities, which means 
the Court has asked Russia to explain its actions (or inactions), a procedure by the 
Court that usually precedes a judgment. Russia has made no effort to pass legislation 
that would require implementation of ECtHR rulings, and indeed, political and national 
court officials have in recent years been voicing strong criticisms of the ECtHR, 
claiming interference with internal affairs. So it is unclear what will occur if and when 
the Court rules against Russia in these Witness cases.
All these criticisms of the Court and its rulings have placed pressure on the Court 
to more fully recognize the legal pluralism that exists with the many diverse nations 
that make up the CoE. The following discussion of some recent selected cases may 
indicate ways the Court is attempting to deal with the many pressures it faces in 
dealing with the contemporary makeup of the CoE. 
Recent Religion Cases of Interest
Some recent ECtHR cases seem particularly of interest in terms of understanding 
the evolving jurisprudential record of the Court in the area of religion. Perhaps not 
surprisingly many of these cases involve Islam in some manner. These cases may 
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demonstrate an effort by the Court to make decisions that increase the chances of 
successful integration of Islam into the fabric of Europe, as well as show that the Court 
is not always acting in ways that promote a Christian or even a secular agenda, a 
controversial and much-discussed claim5. Adrian’s (2019) discussion of SAS v. France, 
Dahlab v. Switzerland, Sahin v. Turkey, and Ebrahimian v. France illustrates this 
apparent bias toward a secularist or possible anti-Islam agenda. She states: 
The Court’s judgements have barred elementary school teachers from wearing 
the headscarf in public schools, restricted university students from wearing 
the veil, banned the face veil from all citizens in most public spaces, and ... 
stripped civil servants from the right to wear the headscarf at work. Thus the 
type of wearers (from civil servants to citizens) and the spaces (from schools, to 
streets, to other public institutions) have broadened in the past 16 years, thereby 
curtailing the right to manifest religious freedom for more people in more places 
(Adrian, 2018, p. 9).
Adrian further notes that these decisions represent an expansion of “the already 
extensive application of the margin of appreciation allowed to states”, and that this 
posture of the Court, “undermines the mandate of the Court to protect vulnerable 
minority populations in Europe” (Adrian, 2018, p. 10).
Ferri (2018) discusses some of these same cases, among others, asserting that 
taken as a groups the cases represent the Court’s avoidance of its “positive obligation” 
to promote ideological and cultural pluralism. By this she means that states have a 
positive obligation to take measures designed to guarantee effective implementation 
of human rights within their jurisdiction. She too is critical of the wide margin of 
appreciation granted to some member states in such matters because it seems to 
absolve states of performing their duties toward their citizens in the area of human 
rights, including religious rights.
Medda-Windischer (2018) offers a somewhat more sympathetic interpretation of 
recent decisions by the Court, including those discussed by Adrian and by Ferri6. She 
says (Medda-Windischer, 2018, p. 52): 
If it is true that the Strasbourg Court has in those cases displayed a rather 
restrictive approach towards accommodating religious diversity, it is also true 
that, in other cases, the Court has discarded a militant form of secularism and 
has followed a more pluralistic model of open secularism.
Medda-Windischer (2018, p. 62) goes on to discuss some of the cases she thinks 
demonstrate a greater appreciation and support for a more pluralistic model, asserting 
that the Court has sometimes treated the Convention as a “living instrument”, and 
5 For discussions pro and con of a possible pro-Christian and/or anti-Muslim bias in the Court’s 
jurisprudence also see the entire volume edited by Durham et al. (2012) as well as Martinez-Torron 
(2014/2017), Meerschaut and Gutwirth (2008), Kayaoglu (2018), and Barras (2018).
6 Also see Martinez-Torron (2015) for a more sympathetic analysis of the Court’s religion decisions.
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that “the Court can be influenced by the development of standards shared by member 
states of the Council of Europe”. She adds (Medda-Windischer, 2018, p. 63):
The principles applied so far by the Court in cases related to the freedom of religion 
represent a pragmatic response to variations existing among states in interpreting 
the right to manifest one’s religion. In particular, the most controversial margin of 
appreciation can be considered as an implementation of the general principle of 
subsidiarity regulating – in international law – the relation between national and 
supranational bodies, such as the European Union and the Council of Europe. 
The more recent decisions to be discussed below seem to vary from the overall 
thrust of earlier cases involving aspects of Islam, and may suggest efforts by the 
Court to accommodate the ethnic, religious, cultural, and legal pluralism that exists 
within the CoE. Perhaps some of these selected cases demonstrate the pragmatism 
that Medda-Windischer (2018) claims to see in some recent, but sometimes quite 
controversial decisions.
Russia’s Extremism Statute and the ECtHR
In the wake of the 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center in New York, a number of 
nations passed various statutes designed to assist in the “war on terrorism”7. One 
of the most far-reaching was passed in Russia, and this new statute has been used 
since against a number of minority religions, ironically including even ones whose 
explicit teachings promote non-violence in human affairs. Thus the new extremism 
law has been used to declare entire groups such as the Jehovah’s Witnesses (JW) as 
extremist, leading to the dissolution of the national JW organization, confiscation of all 
JW property, and the arrest of practicing members of the group. This in turn has led 
to the filing of nearly 50 applications with the ECtHR by the Witnesses with the Court 
having “communicated” with Russia about many of the cases, which means they are 
being considered for adjudication.
The statute has also been used against the teachings of Islamic scholar Said 
Nursi8, a well-known Turkish Muslim theologian who has written about the meaning of 
the Qu’ran. Applications were filed with the ECtHR by a Russian citizen, a publisher 
of Nursi’s books, and a national religious organization, claiming a violation of Article 9 
(freedom of religion or belief) an Article 10 (freedom of expression), and these 
applications were dealt with together in the 28, August, 2018 decision in Ibragim 
Ibragimov and others v. Russia (Duval, 2018). This important decision, which found 
a violation of Article 10 in light of Article 9, makes it clear that the extremism statute 
cannot be applied against a group or publication unless there is an explicit incitement 
to hatred or violence contained in the writings. The decision also explicitly criticized 
the Russian courts for accepting one-sided expert reports on the writings in question, 
7 For one example of the reaction see James T. Richardson’s discussion of what occurred in Australia 
(Richardson, 2013).
8 In Russia, several Nursi’s writings has been included into the “Federal List of Extremist Materials” 
(Editor's note).
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and not allowing counter expert opinions to be considered by the courts. This decision 
focused on the ECtHR’s assessment of what constitutes “hate speech” and ruled 
that the writings in question did not qualify as such, citing as precedent the famous 
“Pussy Riot” case of 2018 (Mariya Alekhina and Others v. Russia)9. The ECtHR referred 
several times in its decision to the report of the Venice Commission (2008) which was 
critical of the Russian extremism statute and its application to rather selected religious 
groups and writings. The ECtHR also indicated support for the right to proselytize and 
promote one’s religious beliefs to others. How Russia responds to this quite critical 
ruling remains to seen. However, this ruling suggests that the eventual decisions on 
many JW cases will also favor the applicants, thus raising the stakes considerably for 
Russia, for the ECtHR, and even the Council of Europe itself. 
Shari’a and the ECtHR
For nearly two decades the ECtHR has, through its jurisprudential record, posited that 
the values and principles of Shari’a are incompatible with the values of democracy and 
human rights enshrined in the European Convention. This was made clear in 2003 
with a controversial decision in Refah Partisi and Others v. Turkey (13 Feb., 2003) 
which supported the Turkish government’s decision to dissolve the largest political 
party in Turkey. The Partisi decision has been criticized as demonstrating a limited 
understanding of Islam (see i.e., Meerschaut & Gutwirth, 2008, among others). However, 
the decision in Molla Sali v. Greece, rendered on Dec. 18, 2018 (HUDOC Information 
Note, Molla Sali v. Greece, 2018) might be viewed as undermining the firm stance 
taken in Partisi, although that assessment is controversial (Puppinck, 2018). The case 
involved a Muslim woman whose husband left her all his property with a common law 
will properly notarized according to Greek law. However, the will was challenged by the 
husband’s sisters who claimed that since the husband was Muslim inheritance should 
be dictated under Shari’a law which would result in the two sisters being the recipients 
of three quarters of the inheritance10. The Greek courts, although initially favoring 
the widow, on appeal issued a ruling siding with the sisters and annulling the Greek 
common law will. The Court indicated that inheritance had to be settled according to 
Shari’a law or Greece would be in violation of the Treaty of Lausanne granting the right 
of the Islamic minority in Thrace to be governed in domestic matters by Shari’a law.
The widow than appealed to the ECtHR, claiming violations of Article 6.1 (right to 
a fair trial) taken alone and in conjunction with Article 14 (discrimination) and Article 1 
of Protocol 1 (property). The case was initially assigned to a section, but then, in a 
somewhat unusual move, was relinquished to the Grand Chamber for adjudication. 
In a lengthy and thorough ruling the Grand Chamber unanimously found a violation 
of Article 14 (discrimination) in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol 1 (protection 
of property). The key question addressed by the Court was whether the widow was 
discriminated against in a manner that would not have occurred had she not been 
9 See Maclean (2018) for a discussion of this and related Pussy Riot cases.
10 The practice of Shari’a law in Greece in the Muslim community of Thrace is an anomaly which dates 
back to the terms of a population exchange between Greece and Turkey embedded in the 1923 Treaty of 
Lausanne.
Changing Societies & Personalities, 2019, Vol. 3, No. 4, pp. 303–318 311
a Muslim. The Court concluded that indeed she was treated differently because of 
her faith, thus resulting in the decision that her claim under Article 14 was warranted.
However, the Court, rather than affirming its hard stance against applications of 
Shari’a, indicated that, if a country desired, Shari’a could be acceptable under certain 
circumstances that involved an informed choice by all parties to allow domestic matters 
to be governed under Shari’a. But the Court’s explanation of what circumstances 
might warrant acceptance of Shari’a were not entirely clear, leaving room for debate 
and needing further clarification (World Politics Review, 2018; Puppinck, 2018).
The implications of the Molla Sali decision may be immense, as the decision may 
be viewed ultimately as another example of the Court recognizing legal pluralism 
in the contemporary world, and an effort by the Court to find ways to better integrate 
Islam into the fabric of Europe11. Greece seems in the process of attempting to 
address the discrepancy between European anti-discrimination law and the practice 
of allowing Shari’a personal law in the Thrace area, as per the Lausanne Treaty of 
1923. It recently modified relevant laws prior to the Molla Sali decision (which was 
decided under extant law prior to the change), allowing for the optional application of 
Shari’a law. However, this recent action by the Greek government have been subject 
to considerable criticism as potentially limiting personal choice of women in the 
Muslim community because the family and societal pressures they may face to submit 
to Shari’a law may render moot the ‘optional’ aspect (World Politics Review, 2018).
Blasphemy and the Prophet Mohammed: E.S. v. Austria
On October 25, 2018 the ECtHR decided a quite controversial case from Austria, 
E.S. v. Austria, ruling that Austria had not violated Article 10 (freedom of expression) 
when its courts refused to overturn a decision that the applicant had violated the 
criminal code of Austria making it illegal to disparage religious precepts. The 
applicant had referred to Muhammad as a pedophile during presentation at a 
seminar entitled “basic Information on Islam” presented by right-wing Freedom Party 
Institute, resulting in the charges against her and a resulting fine. This claim about 
Mohammed was based on the apparently historical fact that Muhammed had, at the 
age of 56, married a nine-year-old girl.
The Court ruled that the application of the law had a legitimate aim of preventing 
disorder by safeguarding religious peace and protecting religious feelings of Austrian 
citizens who were Muslims. The Court indicated that the seminar presentation had 
been misleading and was not in fact an objective treatment of Islam. The Court thus 
granted a very wide “margin of appreciation” to Austria in the matter, indicating that 
government officials were closer to the situation and better able to understand the 
importance of applying the statute in this matter.
Note that this decision, while of concern to advocates of freedom of expression, 
aligns, for good or ill, with much earlier decisions where the Court upheld restrictions on 
11 It is noteworthy, as the Court notes, that Shari’a law is allowed in at least one other CoE country 
under limited circumstance (domestic law in the U.K.), and applications of Shari’a rules in the area of 
finance are also spreading among CoE member nations (Possamai, Richardson & Turner, 2014; Ahmed 
Aries & Richardson, 2014).
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blasphemy against Christianity. These early decisions include Otto-Preminger Institut 
v. Austria (20 Sept., 1995), and Wingrove v. UK. (20 Nov., 1996), which were at the time 
also controversial in part because they seemed to be supportive of efforts to control 
blasphemy, but only in favor of Christianity. Perhaps the recent E.S. decision will level 
the playing field a bit and indicate that the Court is seeking a path that recognizes the 
extant pluralism of many CoE countries. However, for proponents of free speech E.S. 
and the Otto-Preminger and Wingrove decisions represent significant limitations of 
freedom of expression.
Religious Attire in the Courtroom: Hamidovic v. Bosnia and Herzegovina
The wearing of religious attire in public has been a major point of contention throughout 
Europe in recent years, mainly provoked by the desire of many Muslims to wear 
apparel that identifies them with their faith. And usually the ECtHR has seemed tone-
deaf to the concerns of Muslims, rejecting most applicants who bring cases dealing 
with religious dress to the Court12. However, this attitude of the Court may be shifting 
somewhat, as indicated by a recent case.
The Hamidovic case, decided in December, 2017, involved a member of a 
fundamentalist Islamic religious community who was called to testify in court in Bosnia-
Herzegovina (BiH), but who refused to take off his Islamic skullcap as instructed by 
the judge. The witness was respectful of the court and willing to testify but unwilling 
to remove his headgear for religious reasons. He was sanctioned for contempt and 
fined 5,000 Euros (later reduced on appeal to 1,500 Euros), but he did not pay the fine 
and thus was sentenced to 30 days imprisonment. After he was released Hamidovic 
sought relief from the Constitutional Court of BiH which ruled against him, stating that 
his contempt citation was a lawful interference with his religious rights. Hamidovic 
then applied to the ECtHR for relief, claiming that his rights under articles 9 and 14 of 
the Convention had been violated.
The ECtHR took considerable care in analyzing the case, noting that among other 
things BiH was 51% Muslim and 46% Christian, with a constitution that guaranteed 
religious freedom and was based on secular principles. The Court presented results 
of a comparative analysis focusing on rules applied to the wearing of religious symbols 
in court proceedings in 38 CoE member states. This research revealed that only four 
states required removal of headgear in court proceedings and that in those four the rule 
was not enforced consistently. The Court then focused on whether such a requirement 
concerning the removal of religious headgear was necessary in a democratic society, 
and ruled that in this case it was not. The Court found a violation of articles 9 and 14.
The Court tried in its ruling to make it clear that this decision was unique to the 
facts of this case and did not overrule earlier ECtHR decisions concerning religious 
dress in public spaces. It also stated that there might be future cases where removal 
of religious symbols, including headgear, in courtrooms would be justified. Thus, 
12 One exception is Ahmet Arslan v. Turkey App. No. 41135/98, decided Feb. 23, 2010, in which 
Turkey was found to have violated Article 9 when it found 127 members of an Islamic sect to have violated 
Turkish laws when they refused to remove their turbans during court proceedings. But see Jusic (2019) for a 
discussion of contrary cases involving religious garb in legal proceedings.
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the Court tried to limit application of the decision, but nonetheless the decision may 
represent a recognition of some circumstances where basic tenants of Islamic sects 
could prevail within a courtroom setting.
Conclusions 
The European Court of Human Rights has become one of the most powerful international 
courts in the world. But the gradually accruing success and growing influence of the Court 
over the decades since its creation have raised concerns among several of its original 
sponsors in the CoE. Also, the operating environment of the Court has undergone a 
dramatic change with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent addition of 
many former Soviet-dominated nations to the CoE. Thus, the Court has been forced to 
respond to growing disquiet among some original sponsors while at the same time it is 
grappling with thousands of applications from citizens of newer member states whose 
backgrounds and cultures have not been supportive of human rights. 
Not surprisingly the Court has, in the face of these two major concerns, developed 
a complicated bifurcated response and may be in the process of developing a dual 
track jurisprudence in the area of religious regulation as well as in other areas (see 
analyses and empirical evidence offered in Cali, 2018; Jusic, 2018; Stiansen & Voeten, 
2019). Thus the “judicialization of religious freedom” (Mayrl, 2018; Richardson, 2015) 
within the much-enlarged CoE has evolved in a manner cognizant of the vast cultural 
and historical differences among CoE nations. The Court’s more recent jurisprudential 
record seems to promote legal pluralism as it grapples with many differences present 
within the CoE concerning religious practices, as demonstrated particularly by the 
cases cited above involving Islam.
One track seems to treat most original members of the CoE with considerable 
deference involving an expansion of the margin of appreciation, an approach that has 
resulted in allowing those member states to exercise substantial control over human 
rights matters including religious practices as well as other areas. This broad margin 
of appreciation has resulted in the Court often deferring to national governments’ 
attempts to regulate religion in cases dealing with Islam but other cases as well. If the 
member state’s governmental review of the issue involved has been demonstrably 
thorough then the ECtHR has begun to use this as grounds for deferring a substantive 
analysis and finding in favor of the member state. This recently developed track seems 
designed to maintain favor with and support from original member nations.
The second track appears to treat most new members of the CoE (and also 
sometimes Turkey and Greece) as being in need of considerable hands on guidance 
in how it deals with matters involving religious freedom and other human rights. This 
approach can involve a more thorough substantive analysis of the claims before the 
Court and less deference to claims of the member state, even as the Court recognizes 
historical and cultural differences within the newer members of the CoE. This second 
track also has had implications for how the Court has recently been adjudicating 
cases involving Islam, and this development has had an impact on some cases 
concerning Islam brought before the Court from original members of the CoE. This 
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newer jurisprudential pattern involving Islam cases appears to represent a recognition 
of the legal and cultural pluralism that exists not only within newer CoE members, but 
also with original member states as well.
Thus, the Court seems in the process of developing a quite complex jurisprudence 
in its efforts to manage the vastly differentiated landscape of a much enlarged CoE. 
The consequences of applying this complicated mode of operation adopted by the 
Court, and how it comports with the “judicialization of religious freedom” concept 
remains to be seen. As the Court begins to develop a jurisprudence that seems more 
deferential to the cultural and legal pluralism that exists within the new (and older) 
CoE nations, can it succeed in “educating” newer CoE members, some of whom are 
quite recalcitrant and openly hostile to the Court’s rulings and overall authority, while 
treating more consolidated democracies with greater deference? Or will the Court 
end up effectively neutered with respect to older CoE members and ignored by newer 
members? Indeed, there are ultimate questions to be posed concerning the future of 
the Court and of the CoE itself given these recent developments. Can the Court and 
the CoE survive in the modern era with so many conflicting demands being made on 
it? That seems the major question of the time.
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